![]() In 1920, the Supreme Court first applied the “rule of reason” to interpret the Sherman Act and explained that only “unreasonable” restraint of trade through acquisitions, mergers, exclusionary tactics, and predatory pricing constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony… 3Īs Justice Stevens says, quoting Justice Brandeis, “read literally, Section 1 would outlaw the entire body of private contracts since they constrain free trade.” 4 Consequently, the history of antitrust rulings has been a process of determining what constitutes reasonable “restriction of trade” and what does not. Section 1 of the Act-its most frequently cited portion-says:Įvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. The legislation was the result of intense public opposition to the concentration of economic power within corporations and trusts following the Civil War, particularly those that monopolized the market for transporting farm goods by rail. It also authorizes private parties injured by conduct violating the Act to bring suits for treble damages (i.e., three times as much money in damages as the violation cost them). ![]() ![]() The Act declares illegal and a felony any restraint on trade in the United States through either price fixing or monopolization. Its aim was to ensure competition in all forms of business. The Sherman Antitrust Act was named for its author, Senator John Sherman of Ohio, and was enacted in 1890 to limit monopolies and other restraints on commerce. For the reader as well as us researchers, this makes for an exacerbating and technical slog-bear with this, please!-though reviewing case law not only reveals something about the foundations of how professions are conceived today but allows us to imagine spaces of intervention within this formation of law, economy, and architecture. ![]() Understanding the meaning of antitrust law through a review of significant judicial decisions means wading through innumerable cases, each connected to other cases, which serve to qualify the (seemingly) central one. This essay’s foray into US law is complicated by the fact that the United States operates under “common law,” a juridical system in which case law is of primary significance and published judicial opinions central this is in contrast to countries, such as the UK, where codified statutes predominate. While it is not the case that these antitrust proceedings caused the AIA to be ineffectual, that weakness, alongside the weakness of architecture as a profession and the evolving history of antitrust law, affect architectural practice in multiple ways. To offer the conclusion quickly, the answer is, nominally, “no.” But pursuing these questions offers many other lessons about the ways power and economics weave through antitrust laws, about how professions in general, not just architecture, have been and are still treated by these laws. Did we interpret antitrust laws with more paranoia than other professions? Was architecture “unfairly” or unevenly treated in antitrust laws? Hence this research. But I wondered why architects seemed to compete more and earn less than other professions. Architects, like other professionals, must compete for fees with no discussion or be charged with collusion. The answer was direct and unambiguous: two antitrust proceedings against the AIA in 19 were so imprinted on the AIA that such discussions were off-limits. In February of 2014, a colleague and I met with Robert Ivy, CEO of the American Institute of Architects (AIA) to ask why the AIA is so ineffectual in promoting better fees and wages for architects. ![]()
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